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Abstract 
We analyze whether technology inducement prizes could be a useful complement to 
standard research grants and contracts in developing climate change mitigation technologies.  
We find that there are important conceptual advantages to using inducement prizes in certain 
circumstances. These conceptual inferences are borne out by an examination of the track  
record of prizes inducing research into public goods, including relevant energy technologies. 
However, we also find that the prizes’ successes are contingent on their proper design. We 
analyze how several important design elements could influence the effectiveness of a climate 
technology prize. 
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Technology Prizes for Climate Change Mitigation 
Richard G. Newell and Nathan E. Wilson∗ 
 
1. Introduction 
Ninety percent of the energy consumed globally comes from fossil fuels, whose 
combustion generates the bulk of the greenhouse gases (GHG) that are linked to global climate 
change. In response to growing concern about the potential damages from climate change, many 
of the world’s governments, including the government of the United States, have agreed on the 
goal of stabilizing GHG concentrations. If stabilization is to be accomplished without drastically 
reducing energy consumption, the world needs a new energy system capable of meeting demand, 
but with close to zero net emissions. The adoption of such an energy system is conditional on the 
development of new technologies. At present, the most commonly cited technology options for 
reducing GHG emissions are increased energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, advanced 
nuclear generation, and carbon capture and storage.  
Although there is broad agreement on the need for more research, private sector 
incentives to research GHG-reducing technologies fall short of being socially efficient. 
Notwithstanding the recent adoption of the Kyoto Protocol and other domestic and international 
policies, the market largely fails to internalize the impact of human activities on the climate. In 
the absence of policies that would place a market price on GHG emissions—such as a carbon tax 
or cap-and-trade system—consumers and firms do not have adequate incentives to constrain 
emissions through adoption of better technologies. Even if policies are implemented to 
internalize some of the expected costs of GHG emissions, it will likely be politically difficult to 
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fully internalize the expected social costs of climate damage any time soon. Moreover, it is 
extremely difficult for national governments and the international community to credibly commit 
to a long-term future path of climate policies involving more dramatic reductions. These factors 
significantly curtail current corporate interest in developing GHG-reduction technologies.  
Even if there were not institutional impediments that prevented environmental costs from 
being accounted for in the marketplace, the level of research spending on climate change 
mitigation technologies would probably still fall short of the socially efficient level (Jaffe, 
Newell, and Stavins 2005). This reflects the fact that research is characterized by market 
imperfections that reduce incentives for investment. First, the benefits of developing a new 
technology or product do not accrue only to its discoverer. Rather, they spill over, benefiting 
society and other firms. This is the inverse of the pollution externality problem, where the 
benefits are concentrated in the polluter and the environmental damages are diffuse.  
Second, the impact of a technological advance tends to be positively associated with the 
extent of its adoption, which means that the innovating firm’s returns are contingent on factors 
beyond its control. If other firms develop compatible technologies, the innovator will benefit 
more, but if a different technological standard becomes the norm, the innovator’s profits will be 
markedly less. The implied uncertainty of being dependent on others’ behaviors could reduce 
firms’ incentives to innovate.  
Third, other forms of incomplete information also characterize the innovation and 
diffusion of a technology. For example, in the context of environmental problems such as climate 
change, returns on investment are contingent on the size and shape of future government policies 
and international negotiations. Such widespread uncertainty makes estimating returns extremely 
difficult, which can lead to underinvestment in research. Because of these complicating factors, 
an innovation that could lead to an overall improvement in social welfare will sometimes not be 
pursued because the private incentives for its development are not sufficiently large. Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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The externalities that characterize both the economics of the environment and technology 
suggest that it may be efficient to add proactive inducement policies to the traditional incentive 
system of patents and intellectual property rights to encourage new GHG mitigation 
technologies. The traditional system encourages research by granting innovators temporary 
monopoly rents on what they develop. The federal government complements this framework 
through the use of inducement mechanisms, including: tax credits for specific types of research 
and development (R&D); direct subsidization of research through grants or contracts to the 
private or academic sector; and active pursuit of new research through its laboratories or other 
research facilities (Macauley 2005).  
Despite their differences, each of these efforts, including tax credits, incentivizes the 
development of new technologies primarily by subsidizing the cost of research inputs. These 
research subsidy methods have achieved considerable successes in stimulating research in the 
past, including in the area of global climate change. In particular, university- and lab-based 
research contracts and grants have been used in pursuit of climate change technology R&D. 
Despite these policies’ past efficacy, there is growing interest in the possibility that government 
research policy could be improved by also using a different type of mechanism, one that pays for 
outputs rather than inputs. Scholars have shown that output-oriented policy levers can achieve 
significant results by changing the incentives faced by researchers. Among these output-oriented 
policies, the option that consistently receives the most attention is the award of technology 
inducement prizes. 
In theory, a prize focusing on technology would seem to be quite straightforward: It 
should reward an individual or group for some novel or innovative technological achievement. In 
implementation, however, technologically oriented prizes are considerably complex. First, they 
can be divided into two categories depending on when the prize giver’s goal is specified. An ex 
post prize provides an award (financial, honorary, or both) for work that has already been done Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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and that likely would have been conducted even in the absence of the award. Also known as 
reward prizes, this type of prize is common in the public and the private sectors.1  
Although ex post awards are useful methods of recognizing researchers who have done 
outstanding work, they are an indirect way of spurring new R&D investment in a given direction. 
When specific innovations are desired, prize givers are more likely to use an ex ante prize, in 
which the technological threshold or target is specified prior to when the research takes place. 
This type of prize induces new innovations, rather than rewards past breakthroughs (Maurer and 
Scotchmer 2003; Davis and Davis 2004). Like reward prizes, inducement prizes have a long 
history, dating back at least to the early 18th century. Until very recently, their modern usage has 
been mainly in the private sector. Over the past 10 years, however, there has been significant 
growth in governmental use of inducement prizes aimed at various stages of the innovation 
process. Prominent examples include both the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Prizes 
have even been included in the U.S. Senate’s proposed energy bill.2 
In this paper, we focus primarily on inducement prizes targeted at the middle stages of 
the technological change process: applied research, development, and demonstration. We note, 
however, that in practice many of the technology development and procurement contracts 
currently given by government agencies such as the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) are a 
type of technology prize, often awarded through a competitive bidding process (Taylor 1995). 
The prize, in that case, may take the form of a commitment to procure a certain amount of 
equipment of a particular quality at a particular price. Whereas an award established to 
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encourage a path-breaking new development would necessarily need to be structured somewhat 
differently from one focusing on developing a demonstration model or commercializing an 
already proven technology, there are lessons to be shared across these experiences. 
Scholars have begun to pay more attention to how prizes function and whether they may 
be used to counter some of the problems associated with both the patent system and input-
oriented inducement policies. Our paper contributes to this literature by examining whether or 
not technology inducement prizes for GHG-reducing technologies would be a useful 
complement to the standard policy tools (contracts and grants) already being used. We begin in 
Section 2 by examining the economics characteristics of prizes. Next, in Section 3, we briefly 
analyze how inducement prizes have been used in the past and how they are being used today. In 
Section 4 we discuss the design structure for prizes and how and why it might vary. Throughout 
Section 4, we examine how climate change prizes might be influenced by these considerations. 
We conclude the paper in Section 5. 
2.  Economics of Prizes 
In this section, we establish a framework and vocabulary through which to discuss the 
economic characteristics of inducement prizes. Although designs can differ considerably, prizes 
in any setting share some common elements. These factors appear to be common to all types of 
technology prizes and are not likely to be substantially different for the goal of stimulating GHG-
reducing technologies. First, we develop a simple model to compare prizes to traditional R&D 
subsidization methods (Section 2.1); then we demonstrate how prizes differ from other 
technology policy instruments in how they deal with uncertainty (Section 2.2). Finally, we 
consider the intertwined issues of researcher participation and duplicative research (Section 2.3). 
Some advantages and disadvantages of prizes and of the grant and contracting processes are 
summarized in Table 1.  Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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2.1.  A Simple Model of Prizes 
Some prize characteristics emerge from an examination of how prizes induce innovation. 
In considering this process, we use a qualitative model built on Wright’s (1983) work on 
innovative activity.3 For the sake of clarity, the model is highly simplified. We make use of it not 
because we believe it to be fully realistic but rather because it illustrates some key points.4 
Consider a situation in which a number of firms that are pursuing a given, discrete 
invention. For the firm that successfully discovers it, the invention leads to a certain amount of 
private gains. In addition to these private gains, the discovery leads to an increase in social 
benefits that is not captured by the discovering firm. In pursuit of the innovation, each firm 
incurs certain costs, which are a function of the firm’s private research expenditures and the total 
amount of research by all firms. The probability that the innovation will be developed is a 
function of the total amount of research. Assume that the incremental probability of success 
decreases as the total amount of research spending grows. In other words, over the relevant range 
of research investment spending, each additional dollar has a smaller impact on increasing the 
probability of successfully developing the innovation.  
The economic problem from society’s perspective is to maximize net benefits from 
research—that is, the difference between the expected overall social value of the prize and the 
research costs. The optimal value of aggregate research occurs at the point where the expected 
incremental social benefit from more research equals its incremental cost. The amount of 
research that the firm will undertake simply because of private incentives will be optimal only if 
the market perfectly captures all of the benefits and costs to the development of the new 
technology. As noted above, scholars have shown that this rarely occurs, because of various 
                                                 
3 Readers who are interested in the mathematical formulation can find it in the Appendix, where much of the 
following discussion is reproduced and complemented with a formal quantitative model. 
4 Some key assumptions are embedded in the model. An important informational assumption is that all parties are 
aware of each other’s costs, benefits, and probabilities of innovation. Competitors know how much money they can 
expect to earn in the market from the successful development of the innovation, and the prize sponsor knows the 
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spillover effects. For innovations connected to public goods such as the environment, this 
optimal amount of research is even more unlikely (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2005; Maurer and 
Scotchmer 2003; Shavell and Ypersele 1999).  
An interested policy maker can remedy the market’s failure to produce the optimal 
amount of research by using inducement mechanisms to increase the level of research spending 
from the level induced by the intellectual property rights system to the optimal level. The 
traditional method for intervening in this way has been for the policy maker to subsidize inputs 
to research by buying research through the use of contracts or grants.5 
Prizes work somewhat more subtly than contracts or grants. By offering a prize of a given 
amount for the development of the innovation, the prize sponsor changes the profit maximization 
problem that research firms face. A competitor’s new expected returns would be a function both 
of the overall likelihood that the innovation will be developed and of their unique probability of 
being the innovator. In this new scenario, a firm’s optimal level of research expenditures will be 
determined by the average probability of the successful development of the innovation—by any 
firm—rather than the incremental probability of successful innovation, as is desired to maximize 
social net benefits. This has significant implications for the proper size of the technology prize.  
Because the incremental probability of innovative success is decreasing in the level of 
research spending, the average probability of success will tend to be greater than the incremental 
probability of success. Therefore, if the prize is set equal to the full social value of the innovation 
(that is not otherwise captured by the private sector), the use of a prize will lead to excessive 
research. This means that the prize sponsor should make the prize amount a fraction of the 
uncaptured social value. This implies that the sponsors can, in principle, achieve the optimal 
level of research investment with less of a financial outlay by using a prize mechanism than by 
using grants or contracts. In practice, prizes also have other characteristics that distinguish them 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that the optimal level of research spending is not easy to determine. This has led some scholars 
to suggest that the optimal solution is for contestants themselves to propose the size of the prize, as they are better 
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from grants and contracts. Perhaps the most obvious such characteristics are the non-financial 
benefits, such as media attention and prestige, which can accompany prizes. 
2.2.  Technology Policy Choice under Uncertainty 
The foregoing discussion highlights some of the theoretical and practical advantages of 
technology prizes. It is, however, highly abstracted from real world considerations that are 
difficult to incorporate into a simple model. Of special importance is that it neglects differences 
in the availability of certain information to research performers versus research sponsors. That is, 
the research process can be characterized by significant information asymmetry problems, 
particularly with regard to the cost of research and the likelihood of success. Different types of 
technology inducement mechanisms address informational asymmetries in different ways. Thus, 
when choosing whether to use prizes or subsidies to encourage research in a given area, policy 
makers should consider the specific situation. 
In particular, economic problems can result from situations in which the party with less 
information bears the risk of failure. If individuals do not bear full responsibility for their 
actions, they have implicit or explicit incentives to act in inefficient ways, leading to so-called 
principal-agent problems. For example, consider a situation where one party—the principal—
contracts with another—the agent—to pursue a given goal. If payment is not conditional on 
success and the principal’s ability to observe and measure effort is limited, the agent can shirk or 
behave in such a way that is aligned with its own, but not the principal’s, incentives. More 
efficient outcomes result if the risk for failure is borne by the agent, who has better information 
on the chance of success given its knowledge of its own behavior.  
With respect to technology policy, it seems reasonable to conclude that researchers 
typically have better information than the policy maker on their own chances of success. 
Therefore, economics theory suggests that, other things being equal, it is better if researchers 
bear the risk of failure. Technology prizes allocate risk in this manner by paying for research Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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only in the event of success. A firm that participates in a prize competition will be penalized both 
for any cost overruns in the pursuit of the specified innovation and for being overly optimistic 
about its chances of success. Any deviation from the specific goal of the prize increases the 
firm’s likelihood of not winning the award and not recouping its costs; and if a research firm 
lacks confidence in its chances of success it will have an incentive not to pursue the prize. Thus, 
the economic characteristics of prizes help to limit the research pool to the most qualified firms, 
which should efficiently tailor their research activities in the pursuit of the goal. 
Where they do not bear the risk of failure, the researchers will have less incentive to be 
efficient in both the innovations they pursue and the manner in which they pursue them. Under a 
stereotypical grant and contract process, the research sponsor assumes the risks from researchers, 
and subsidizes their efforts regardless of whether or not they achieve their goals. This situation is 
vulnerable to principal-agent problems. For example, if failure does not cost them anything, 
researchers might solicit contracts or grants even when they know that their efforts have little 
chance of success. If the agency sponsor cannot fully discriminate between deserving and 
undeserving proposals, this can lead to an inefficient allocation of research funds (Kremer 2000).  
It must be noted, however, that in practice research subsidy policies do not always lead to 
inefficient outcomes. In particular, R&D contracts and grants may be well suited to support basic 
research because the incentives of the government and the researcher are aligned. The sponsor’s 
goal is to expand the pool of what is known and to disseminate this knowledge quickly so as to 
maximize knowledge spillovers. Those on the receiving end of government research grants tend 
to be scientists located either in academic institutions or government laboratories, where they 
have career incentives to publish pure research papers as quickly as possible. Thus, they may 
have little reason to deviate from what the government wants them to do. 
Where this synchronicity of incentives does not exist, however, the contract and grant 
processes may be less suitable. In particular, there may be problems when the government 
wishes to spur applied R&D or commercialization of proven technologies, realms where Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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government success has been much more checkered (Cohen and Noll 1991).  Because the 
government cannot perfectly monitor behavior after a contract has been awarded, researchers 
may be consciously or subconsciously tempted to deviate from the specific goal to pursue more 
fundamental science, which is where most of them have career incentives to publish (Kremer 
2000). Although deserving of attention, the costs of shirking or inefficient research subsidization 
should not be exaggerated. Most researchers and associated institutions likely wish to receive 
grants on multiple occasions. Therefore, it is not in their interest to alienate sponsors by gaining a 
reputation for inefficient behavior. It is also worth pointing out that many flawed or failed 
research programs’ problems stemmed from factors other than principal-agent issues. 
In an effort to reduce inefficiency, policy makers have incorporated prize-like elements 
into contracts and grants in an effort to address information asymmetry problems (Taylor 1995; 
Che and Gale 2003). For example, it is now common for a grant or contract to be awarded after a 
review of researchers’ competitive proposals. The information asymmetry problem can be 
further reduced through the use of a multistaged proposal process in which the government 
sponsor solicits information on how researchers would respond to possible contracts. It can then 
use this information to rescale or otherwise modify the contract. Such steps help to mitigate—
although they do not completely remove—the informational asymmetry problem faced by policy 
makers when using grants or contracts. 
In conclusion, the presence of information asymmetries influences the choice of 
inducement mechanism. Where policy makers do not have a particular technological output in 
mind, they may be better off eschewing prizes. Instead, they could allow researchers to submit 
bids for a contract or grant, which would then be peer reviewed to ascertain their quality. 
However, when policy makers are able to identify a technologically specific area that they 
believe is underserved by market incentives, there may be efficiency gains to using a prize to 
attract investigation. Overall, the offsetting characteristics of the different technology policy 
levers suggest that when policy makers want additional research in a broad variety of Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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technological areas, the optimal portfolio of stimulus mechanisms should include prizes in 
addition to contracts and grants.  
2.3.  Research Participation and Duplication 
In addition to dealing with uncertainty differently than contracts or grants, prizes also 
have a different impact on the level and nature of research participation. The most important 
reason for this is that prizes can reduce the bureaucratic and accounting barriers to entry that 
accompany the grant and contracting processes. Such hurdles are costly and complicated, 
frequently making it hard for small firms and other newcomers to compete for research support 
under the standard research subsidy framework (Holtz-Eakin 2004; Kremer 2000).  The ability to 
attract these smaller players is one of prizes’ allures, because small players may have greater 
willingness than the institutionalized competitors for grants and contracts to depart from the 
mainstream technological paradigm. Scholars explain this by suggesting that contests can induce 
participants to become less risk averse, causing them to pursue more technologically radical 
concepts (Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983).  
Although they lower bureaucratic barriers to entry, prizes shift risk in a way that may 
create an impediment to participation. This is because, unlike contracts and grants, technology 
prizes typically offer competitors no funding up front. Competitors must self-finance all their 
research spending, and are reimbursed only in the event that they win the competition. If 
participants are risk neutral and not credit constrained, this arrangement may have no effect on 
their decision to participate in the contest. However, in the more likely case that researchers are 
risk averse and do face cash-flow constraints, the unavailability of up-front funding could 
dissuade them from competing. Small firms may be most susceptible to this problem because 
they are least able to afford expenditures without compensation. Thus, although prizes can be 
argued to reduce the bureaucratic barriers to entry, they raise a liquidity obstacle.  Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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Overall, historic evidence (discussed in Section 3.1) seems to indicate that the first effect 
tends to outweigh the latter, but a prize designer must pay attention to the question to ensure that 
specific circumstances do not lead to an undesirable outcome. That analysis should include 
consideration of the fact that more competitors are not necessarily a good thing. For several 
reasons, an overabundance of research investment is not always better from the perspective of 
social welfare. First, there is the problem of diminishing returns to investment: There comes a 
point where an additional dollar of research expenditures will not produce sufficient additional 
expected benefits to justify the cost. In addition, there tends to be only a finite number of 
innovative ideas for any given technology at a given time. Research firms “fish” in this 
“common pool.” As the number of competitors increases, the likelihood that multiple entrants 
will pursue the same research idea also increases, resulting in a greater likelihood of wasteful 
duplication of effort. The marginal increases in the likelihood of development are outweighed by 
the higher costs incurred.  
An excessive number of competitors also can lead to other efficiency penalties, because it 
affects firms’ effort levels. As the number of entrants increases, drawn by the promise of a 
financial award and media attention, the probability of victory for the other participants declines. 
Under the conditions we specified, this should cause a reduction of each individual firm’s effort 
(as measured by each firm’s research spending). If the “first” entrants are highest in quality and 
have a better chance of overall victory, then the addition of each new marginal competitor could 
cut into the expected social benefit from the prize (Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Fullerton and 
McAfee 1999). 
Although we need to take these problems seriously, they should not be overstressed. In 
practice, given existing budgetary pressures, the probability of an excessively high prize is 
unlikely to be as large a problem as the reverse. Moreover, duplicative and wasteful research 
endeavors are common to other research-incentivizing processes (e.g., patent races), as are issues Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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associated with efficient spending levels in a competitive situation (Baumol 2002).6 Depending 
on the magnitude of the social benefit that the new innovation could bring, some degree of 
duplication may be efficient. This is especially the case because scholars have found that it is 
typically necessary for firms to engage in their own research in order for them to be capable of 
absorbing the results of knowledge generated by others—a type of learning by doing. There are 
also ways for technology prize designers to potentially limit duplicative research. Perhaps the 
most prominent methods are intermediary competitive steps or requiring firms to pay to compete 
(Fullerton and McAfee 1999). Both methods eliminate contestants who are—or feel themselves 
to be—less likely to win the overall competition. These methods are discussed in greater length 
in Section 4.5. 
In the end, the choice between prizes and contracts or grants must reflect an analysis of 
the costliness of the necessary research as well as the efficient number of participants. In some 
cases, prizes may be “scaled” out of policy relevance by the necessary level of spending. Where 
costs are lower, prize givers may need to strike a balance between encouraging the number of 
entrants and the need to minimize excessive investment. 
3. Prize  Implementation 
Having established a conceptual understanding of how prizes work, we now discuss how 
they have actually been implemented. First, we consider historic examples; second, we analyze 
the growing use of prizes. Many of the historic and contemporary examples are summarized in 
Table 2.  
                                                 
6 Only under a grant- or contract-based system—one in which there are no competitive steps—could such problems 
be avoided. Because the research would not occur without the subsidy, the policy-wielder can ensure that no 
duplication takes place by funding only one researcher. Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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3.1.   Historic Examples of Technology Prizes 
Longitude. Perhaps the most famous use of a technology inducement prize dates from 
1714 when the British government received a joint petition from the Royal Navy, London 
merchants, and commercial ships’ captains. All were greatly concerned about their losses due to 
ships’ poor navigational capabilities. The government responded by offering three increasingly 
large prizes to the inventors of devices capable of measuring longitude with a given degree of 
accuracy. A method accurate to within one degree would receive £10,000; a method accurate to 
within 40 minutes would earn £15,000; and a method accurate to within one-half of a degree 
would receive £20,000. In today’s currency, the largest award would be worth almost US$3.1 
million.7 The prizes led to wide public interest, which is reflected by their presence in both 
Gulliver’s Travels and a Hogarth illustration. They also produced a boom in navigational 
research. Eventually, John Harrison, a self-educated clockmaker, succeeded where the experts 
failed, devising sufficiently accurate and durable chronometers to earn him the £20,000 in 1773 
(Davis 2002).  
Alkali and Canning. Later in the 18th century, the French government used technology 
prizes to achieve two major industrial breakthroughs. The first prize was instituted in 1775, when 
the French Academy of Sciences announced a reward of 100,000 francs to whoever could 
systematically produce an artificial form of alkali, which was in great demand by both the soap 
and glass industries. The competition led to the successful development of a commercially viable 
process that became the foundation of the French chemical industry (Davis 2002; Mokyr 1990; 
Macauley 2005). Another French technology prize came 20 years later, as Napoleon pondered a 
way to keep his Revolutionary army supplied with food in the field. In an attempt to solve this 
longstanding logistical problem, Napoleon’s Society for the Encouragement of Industry offered a 
                                                 
7 Currency calculations performed using two online currency converters. EH.net’s “How Much is That Worth 
Today?” was used to convert from 1714 British pounds to 2002 British pounds, while www.oanda.com’s historical 
conversion was used to convert from the arbitrarily selected date of April 7, 2002, pounds to April 13, 2005, U.S. 
dollars. Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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prize of 12,000 francs to the inventor of a method for preserving food. After 15 years of 
experimentation, Nicolas Appert won the prize in 1810 for his invention of a method of vacuum 
sealing cooked food in glass bottles (Mokyr 1990; Wright 1983; Maurer and Scotchmer 2003). 
Automobiles. Despite their early history as instruments of government policy, technology 
inducement prizes became much more affiliated with interested private sector parties beginning 
in the 19th century. That does not mean, however, that they ceased to have large social impacts. 
For example, inducement awards played a prominent role in the development of several of the 
20th century’s most important industries. For example, in 1895 the publisher of the Chicago 
Times-Herald sponsored a particularly well-publicized series of prizes built around a race. In 
addition to the winner of the race itself, prizes were set aside for new achievements in speed, 
durability (as measured by distance traveled), aesthetics, and economy (Macauley 2005; Wright 
1996). The publicity surrounding the race and attendant prizes led to significant public interest in 
cars, which, in combination with the prizes themselves, ensured continued entrepreneurial 
interest for the fledgling American automobile industry.  
Airplanes. Technology prizes were also integral to the development of the aviation 
industry (Macauley 2005; Davis and Davis 2004). Interestingly, two different types of 
technology prize were used. For improvements in the distance airplanes could travel, prizes that 
specified a particular threshold were used. “Famous examples include the first flight across the 
English channel in 1909 ($5,000), the first flight across the North Atlantic in 1919 (£10,000), 
and the first nonstop flight from New York to Paris in 1927 ($50,000) ” (Maurer and Scotchmer 
2003, p. 11). By contrast, more contest-like contests spurred incremental improvements in other 
areas (e.g., speed and endurance). Instead of targeting a given technological area, sponsors set up 
large races, which offered $5,000 to $10,000 to the winner. (Entrants could compete in multiple 
races.) Some of the resources supporting the race entrants came from governments interested in 
aviation’s military potential, but private investors also played a large role (Maurer and 
Scotchmer 2003). In addition to their financial incentive for innovation, both types of prizes Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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played a powerful role in supporting the early aviation industry by attracting and maintaining 
popular interest. This further incentivized commercial interest in developing the technology. 
Super-Efficient Refrigerator Program. Despite the decline in governmental use of 
technology prizes in the 20th century, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
experimented with them as a method for incentivizing environmentally friendly innovation in the 
1980s. Instead of using its regulatory “stick” to drive firm behavior, the EPA considered 
developing “Golden Carrot” programs that would offer an incentive for the development of 
products meeting certain design criteria. As of 2005, there has only been one large-scale Golden 
Carrot effort: the Super-Efficient Refrigerator Program (SERP), which was formed in 1991 
(Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer 2004). Under SERP, 25 electric utilities agreed to pool $30.7 
million of demand-side management funds. This guaranteed sum would be available on a piece-
rate basis to the manufacturers of a competitively priced refrigerator that emitted no carbon 
fluorocarbons and used at least 25% less energy than required under then-existing regulations.  
To enter the contest, a company had to have produced at least 100,000 refrigerators the 
previous year. Ultimately, SERP received 14 bids, which were narrowed down to two finalists, 
with Whirlpool winning the competition in June 1993. The SERP model refrigerator ultimately 
did not sell as well as expected, and Whirlpool never received the total allotment of prize money. 
Some scholars have nevertheless argued that SERP paid significant social dividends by proving 
that more efficient refrigerators could be economically produced, making possible the stricter 
2001 technological standard (Davis and Davis 2004; Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer 2004).  
Ansari X-Prize. The recent resurgence in technology inducement prizes’ popularity owes 
much to two privately funded space flights in October 2004 (Maurer and Scotchmer 2003). 
Whereas the broad goal of these flights was to demonstrate the potential for commercial space 
travel, the proximate incentive was the Ansari X-Prize. Established in the mid-1990s in 
conscious emulation of the prizes used to incentivize improvements in the early aviation 
industry, the X-Prize was intended to encourage nongovernmental space research by offering Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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$10 million to the first team to prove that space travel could be regularized. Specifically, the 
winner had to reach an altitude of at least 100 kilometers twice within two weeks. The X-Prize 
and its $10 million award received significant media attention, which helped attract many 
participants.8 Ultimately, 26 teams from seven different countries competed, resulting in over 
$100 million of private R&D, before SpaceShipOne claimed the prize on October 4, 2004.  
Though technology prizes’ proponents tend to consider only their successes, it is worth 
pointing out that the above examples also suggest some of the drawbacks that we discussed in 
Section 2. Consider the X-Prize. Looked at from the prize designers’ perspective, which 
prioritizes space research, the prize was an enormous success. In exchange for $10 million, they 
encouraged $100 million dollars to be invested in pursuit of their cause, leveraging 10 times their 
investment. From a social welfare perspective, however, the enthusiastic response may have 
been inefficient. There might have been an excessive amount of research or duplicative research 
given the potential social benefit, and resources might have been better off supporting other 
projects. It is hard to know how this balances out without further analysis, but the danger is 
clearly there. Similar analyses could also be directed at the other historic cases outlined in 
Section 3.1, and contemporary efforts outlined in Section 3.2.  
3.2.  Current Technology Prizes 
Today, most technology inducement prizes are used by interested parties in the private 
sector to encourage research in areas of particular concern to them. The interested parties often 
establish legally distinct non-profit organizations to administer and coordinate the prize. The X-
Prize was an especially mediagenic example of this practice. Although private institutions 
sponsor the bulk of current prizes, there is also growing interest in using prizes as an instrument 
of government policy. 
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Computing. Like the X-Prize, the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) Cooperative 
Computing Challenge is an example of a technology prize set up by a private foundation. It aims 
to encourage research into using computers cooperatively to address computational issues that 
are too large for even a supercomputer. In order to provide a specific goal to incentivize such 
research, EFF specified that the test of the system would be to discover prime numbers of record 
size. The maximum prize is $250,000 for the first individual or group to discover a prime 
number with at least one billion digits (National Academy of Engineering 1999).9 Another major 
example of a privately established technology prize is the Loebner Prize. It is a formalization of 
Alan Turing’s famous test: to create a computer whose responses in a conversation with a human 
being are indistinguishable from those of a human being. The grand prize for successfully 
creating such a computer is $100,000. Until that prize is won, the team whose computer most 
closely approximates human interaction in any given year receives $2,000 (National Academy of 
Engineering 1999).10  
NASA Centennial Challenges. In spite of the suspension of large Golden Carrot 
programs, technology prizes continue to be used by the U.S. government to induce particular 
types of research. Achieving considerable attention in the wake of the X-Prize, perhaps the most 
high-profile current federal effort is NASA’s Centennial Challenges. In conjunction with its non-
profit partner, the Spaceward Foundation, NASA is offering prizes totaling $400,000 for specific 
innovations over the years 2005 and 2006. There are two research areas where prizes are offered: 
wireless power transmission (“power beaming”), and strong, lightweight tether materials, to be 
used in the creation of a “space elevator.” It seems worth noting that while neither technology 
was specifically selected with climate change mitigation in mind, both could be useful in that 
context. For example, some have suggested that tethers could be used to place extremely 
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efficient wind turbines in the stratosphere (Cohn 2005), and power beaming could be used to 
allow photovoltaic cells on satellites to beam power back to earth (David 2001; Macauley et al. 
2000; Macauley and Davis 2001).  
As with the automobile and aviation examples, the NASA prizes have been set up to 
repeat in the same technological area from one year to the next. In 2005, the winners in both 
categories would receive $50,000. In 2006, the victory conditions become more stringent and the 
grand award increases to $100,000 ($40,000 and $10,000 prizes for second and third place will 
also be given). In both Challenges, all applicants are examined at the same time and the best 
entry is selected as the winner. This is slightly different from the first past-the-post method that 
we have seen in other historic examples. The differences between these prize structures are 
explored in greater depth in Section 4.5.11 
DARPA Grand Challenge. DARPA has also recently begun using technology prizes to 
induce specific types of research. In 2003, the agency established the $1 million DARPA Grand 
Challenge to accelerate research into the development of driverless vehicles, with an overall goal 
of reducing the number of American lives lost on the battlefield. The winner of the prize was to 
be determined by a race across the Mojave Desert in fall 2004. Despite the fact that 15 entrants 
emerged from the qualifying round at the California Speedway, the overall prize went unclaimed 
because none successfully completed the desert course. The lack of winner notwithstanding, 
DARPA viewed the response to the first Grand Challenge as successful enough to repeat the 
competition in 2005, increasing the prize to $2 million. As of February 2005, over 195 teams had 
entered the competition, which will conclude with another desert race in October 2005 (Maurer 
and Scotchmer 2003).12 The massive amount of interest in the Challenge can be seen as evidence 
of the non-market incentives that prizes are able to leverage. DARPA’s use of an intermediary 
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step functions as a way of limiting the amount of waste that such a large number of competitors 
could potentially produce.  
Developing World. Besides reduction of GHGs, there are several other areas where 
scholars have suggested that technology prizes could be used to good effect. Perhaps the most 
credible would be in providing a guaranteed market for goods desired by the developing world 
(Kremer 2000; Masters 2004). Of particular focus are vaccines for diseases such as malaria, and 
products that increase agricultural yields. The social welfare gains to innovations in these areas 
are huge, but firms’ expected benefits from developing them are quite small. There are two key 
problems. The first is that the developing world lacks the resources to purchase and distribute 
new developments. Further inhibiting investigation is the threat that the technology may be 
expropriated on humanitarian grounds. To counter these concerns, donors in the developed world 
would commit to the purchase of a given amount of a developed product (e.g., vaccine or seed). 
With the guarantee of a profitable market, private research funds would hopefully flow into 
previously unattractive areas (Masters 2004; Kremer 2000, 2000)  
4.  Designing a Prize 
In this section, we examine the common elements around which specific prizes can  
be designed. Where relevant, we focus on the impact these differences might have on a  
climate prize.  
The first element we consider is the actual process of creating a prize. Next, we examine 
the institutional setting for the prize. To a large extent, both elements lead to distinctions that 
result from a public sector versus a private sector prize. Even if the prize sponsors’ goals are the 
same, differences in these “meta” components will have a considerable impact on the overall 
nature of the prize because of political economy considerations.  
More specific elements of the prize’s design can be divided into three categories: the 
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(i.e., the victory conditions). Decisions with respect to any of these factors will influence the 
level of participation and overall success of the contest. Throughout, we draw inferences from 
previously introduced examples of past and present prizes. Pertinent aspects of each design 
element are summarized in Table 3. 
4.1.  The Creation Process 
To a considerable extent, the formation of a private sector technology prize is not that 
complicated. If one or more parties decide that the combination of the patent system and 
governmental contracts and grants are doing an insufficient job of incentivizing a given type of 
research, they could pool resources in order to create a prize. This might be done by setting up a 
legally distinct foundation, as was done by the X-Prize’s founders. Alternatively, sponsors might 
simply set aside some of their own capital, as was more common in the early 20th century. 
The issue becomes more complicated if the prize is a tool of government policy. 
Although it is possible that an inducement prize could be established without mandate from the 
U.S. Congress, it is fairly unlikely and all but impossible if the financial award is sizable. For the 
goal of further developing technologies capable of substantially reducing GHG emissions, it 
seems very likely that Congress would have to pass some form of enabling legislation. The 
specificity of the bill could vary, but it almost certainly would identify several factors, most 
notably where the prize would be administered, and possibly how the prize would be funded and 
the level of funding.  
In the case of climate change, there are several obvious administrative options. Given the 
clear relevance of energy technologies to GHG emissions, one or more offices in the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) would appear to be suitable. This is especially true because DOE 
is one of the federal government’s chief science-supporting organizations. Global climate change 
is an environmental issue, so an argument could also be made for locating the prize’s 
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envision elements of the DoD (such as DARPA) becoming involved, given the potential national 
security ramifications of energy policy as well as DoD’s considerable experience with 
technology funding. There is also the National Science Foundation, the Advanced Technology 
Program within the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or the Small Business 
Innovation Research programs within many departments.  
The ultimate choice of a government administrator would likely reflect the specific 
technological goal that was targeted. A prize focusing on components of advanced nuclear 
reactors would be more appropriate for DOE, whereas the development of a device capable of 
constraining emissions in power plants might be better placed in EPA or DOE. If bureaucratic 
hurdles did not prove insurmountable, it might be advantageous to allow the prize to be 
established as a collaborative endeavor between two or more agencies. Bringing together 
individuals with different areas of expertise could reduce information asymmetries. For example, 
officials from DOE could bring insight into nuclear technology, whereas DARPA or NASA 
employees could offer additional insight into the administration of a competitive technology 
prize.  
Partnering with a non-profit foundation is another way the federal government could 
achieve efficiency gains. This was the approach taken with the NASA Centennial Challenges: 
NASA provides the prize money and has designed the challenges, but the non-profit Spaceward 
Foundation will handle most of the administration.13 It is possible but not guaranteed that the use 
of a foundation could lower the overall costs of offering a prize or reduce the impact of biases 
within an agency. It might also be a way for the federal government to assure competitors that 
political biases would not affect the prize. We believe these are fertile areas for further research 
into policy design.  
The question of how to fund a federal prize is not trivial. There are two issues that must 
be addressed. First, the government’s budgetary process works on a yearly basis, which could be 
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problematic because technology prizes are not always awarded in the same year that they are 
announced. Second, the funding must be set up in a way that assures competitors that the 
government will not renege at a later date if attitudes toward the prize’s goals change (Holtz-
Eakin 2004). If there is a significant possibility that a prize’s winner might not emerge for a 
considerable period, then a method for ensuring payment is required. The funds might be 
allocated up front and placed in a private sector escrow account, for instance. Alternatively, the 
federal government could imitate the X-Prize’s structure by purchasing an insurance policy that 
guarantees that the funds will be available (Holtz-Eakin 2004). 
In the case of the DARPA Grand Challenge, the funding concern was not particularly 
large. The appropriation was set up to take account of the possibility that no contestant would 
complete the Challenge and win the prize. Although $1 million was set aside to cover the prize, 
DARPA was able to release the funds and use them for other authorized purposes when no one 
completed the Mojave course (Holtz-Eakin 2004). DARPA’s ease in reallocating the funds 
stemmed at least in part from the fact that the award was quite small relative to the agency’s $2.8 
billion budget. A climate prize might not be so fortunate, depending on where the prize was 
located, which technological goal was specified, the magnitude of the award, and how the winner 
was chosen. Prize designers should take these factors into consideration.  
4.2.  The Institutional Setting 
When set up and run by the private sector, the magnitude and technological focus of the 
prize are delimited mainly by the resources and particular interests of the parties involved. For 
example, a group of uranium mining firms might have an incentive to establish a technological 
prize aimed at speeding the commercial development of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems. 
By contrast, an environmental organization concerned about both nuclear waste and GHG 
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A public sector technology prize faces different problems because of political economy 
concerns. These stem from the fact that the government already engages in considerable amounts 
of R&D support. In some ways, prizes could have advantages over contracts and grants in this 
regard. For example, the use of a prize could lessen the influence of politics on research funding. 
Cohen and Noll (1991) describe many instances in which political economy considerations have 
led to inefficient research spending. In some cases, the wrong programs—from a greater societal 
perspective—receive support. In others, although the initial investment might have been 
appropriate, subsequent events indicated that success would not be forthcoming, but bureaucratic 
inertia and lobbying ensured that the funding was not discontinued. Using prizes could 
substantially reduce the likelihood of both of these situations, especially the latter.  
However, prizes might also have important political economy disadvantages. One 
particularly important disadvantage is that they will require support by at least some of the 
institutions associated with preexisting research support programs. Because these institutions 
could perceive the prizes as an implicit threat, they might react by working to reduce (or at least 
not improve) their effectiveness. There are several different parts of the government that might 
be against new technology programs, but one could have a particularly significant impact: the 
U.S. Congress.  
Congress has considerable latitude in designating specific areas of research for funding. 
In practice, the use of earmarked funds allows it to wield considerable power over how and to 
whom grants and subsidies are dispersed, allowing elected officials to use research funds as a 
form of “pork” to be distributed to supporters or constituents (Kremer 2000; Abramowicz 2003; 
Banks, Cohen, and Noll 1991). Not surprisingly, the allocation of funds in this manner may fall 
significantly short of what is optimal. For example, lobbying by interested parties caused the 
Synfuels program to focus on Appalachian coal, although Western coal was better suited to 
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By making the receipt of funds independent of any governmental oversight, technology 
prizes could considerably disrupt this arrangement, removing politicians’ capacity to target 
rewards to specific recipients. To repress this possible transfer of power, Congress could  
choose to weaken the design of prizes in several ways. First, the relevant appropriations 
committees could specify that funding must be earmarked for non-prize-related activities. 
Second, Congress could place limits on the magnitude of the prize award being offered. This 
could sharply reduce the attractiveness of participation, cutting into its effectiveness. Third, 
Congress could attempt to target the prize to specific contestants by playing an active role in 
specifying the technological goal. 
These types of political economy complications may have bedeviled the establishment of 
the NASA Centennial Challenges. As stated in Section 3.2, the current prize money totals 
$400,000, which will be given out over two years in eight different competitions. The Centennial 
Challenges were not always intended to be this modest in scope. As of December 2004, there 
was still considerable talk about having the Centennial Challenges offer up to $50 million for 
major achievements, possibly including private human space travel. However, in order to give 
individual prizes larger than $250,000, NASA requires congressional action (Zimmerman 2004). 
Similarly, there are large bureaucratic hurdles to overcome in order for NASA to encourage 
private space travel. Despite having made public statements supporting the pursuit of space 
prizes, Congress has not moved to increase NASA’s authority to disperse funds or to facilitate 
private space travel. Indeed, the only relevant bills being considered as of December 2004 would 
have specifically limited NASA from ever being able to give a prize larger than $1 million and 
would have tightened the safety restrictions on any future space flight competitions such as the 
X-Prize (Zimmerman 2004). It is not difficult to foresee similar problems arising in the case of 
climate change mitigation technology research. A fuller treatment on the political economy of 
prizes would be a welcome addition to the discussion of how and where technology inducement 
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4.3.  Specifying the Technological Goal 
Once the institutional setting of the prize has been established, the specific details of the 
prize’s design must be worked out. No doubt, the most important element is what type of 
research the prize seeks to encourage. It is useful to make a distinction between the overarching 
goal and the proximate means objective. The goal represents the social outcome that the designer 
seeks as a result of the efforts induced by the prize. The means objective advances toward that 
goal. Whereas the goal may be quite broad, the research objective should be as specific and 
measurable as possible in order to create clearly understood victory conditions. This narrowness 
of definition allows competitors to know where they should focus their efforts, increasing their 
confidence in their probability of success. 
The relationship between the overarching goal and the proximate means objective can be 
obvious. For example, in the case of John Harrison and his chronometer, the goal of the British 
government was to reduce losses due to navigational errors. Because the chief impediment to 
improving a ship’s ability to navigate was the inability to determine longitude, the choice of 
specific research targets was relatively easy. In other cases, an obvious linkage between the 
proximate and the overall objectives may not exist. Consider, for example, the case of the EFF 
Cooperative Computing Prize. The means objective of calculating a prime number of at least a 
specific number of digits does not immediately follow from the Foundation’s belief that 
cooperative computer networks will lead to significant social benefit. Instead, the EFF prize’s 
designers had to determine what type of behavior could be easily specified and would also 
support their much more theoretical overall goal.  
In many ways, those with an interest in designing prizes to combat global climate change 
face a situation that falls between these two examples. The overarching goal is clear: to slow or 
stop the rise of net GHG emissions in order to mitigate the risk of global climate change. 
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One could simply set the research target as some innovation that curbs net emissions by a 
given amount. This would have the advantage of incentivizing researchers in any technological 
area to participate in the prize. Setting such a broad target would also have disadvantages, 
however. Chief among them would be the increased subjectivity in judging the winner because 
the means by which the major climate technologies mitigate net emissions are significantly 
different. For example, energy efficiency improvements could reduce the overall demand for 
energy, but they would not reduce continuing reliance on GHG-emitting fossil fuels. By contrast, 
research into better renewable technologies could lead to the eventual displacement of fossil 
fuels and might pay dividends by furthering the political goal of reduced fuel imports. However, 
renewables are increasingly alleged to have significant negative externalities. Other possibilities 
include efforts to make fossil fuel consumption more climate friendly through carbon capture 
and storage.  
The differences between these approaches could make judging which entrant had a 
greater aggregate social benefit on the environment highly problematic. Consider a situation 
where two competitors are competing for a prize based on achieving a given net reduction in 
emissions. The entrants meet that goal, but do so using different technological approaches. In 
addition to having other non-climate differences, it is likely that the cost structures of the two 
technologies would differ. Even if both had the same overall cost per dollar of reduction, one 
might require more up-front capital expenditures, whereas the other might have higher operating 
costs. Deciding which entrant was superior would become a contentious and subjective process. 
Without restrictions on the technology included in the prize’s rules, possible competitors would 
be aware of the potential for confusion over the prize’s winner. This would reduce their expected 
benefit from competing and therefore reduce their willingness to participate. 
Given the possible problems associated with a broad set of victory conditions, it seems 
more reasonable that each climate technology prize focus on one research area at a time. Within 
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the growing body of work on “technology roadmaps” to select an aspect for incremental 
improvement or radical innovation as the means objective of the prize. If funds were available, 
different prizes could be offered for improvements in any of the major technologies. 
If the federal government sponsored a climate prize, the choice of technological focus 
might be further complicated by its preexisting use of grants and contracts to research ways of 
reducing GHG emissions. Although the costs of duplicative research must be taken into account, 
there are reasons to believe that a prize could have a beneficial effect regardless of whether it 
was used in an established or new research area. In either case, it could be a good way of filling 
in gaps in the research framework, particularly for applied R&D.  
As noted above, prize competitions have an ability to attract new ideas and new 
participants, in part because they use more than just monetary incentives. In contrast with the 
basic, mainstream research that grants induce, anecdotal evidence implies that prizes attract the 
attention of less hidebound thinkers who are willing to challenge technological orthodoxies 
(National Academy of Engineering 1999). By attracting such practitioners to established research 
avenues such as carbon sequestration or renewable fuels, inducement prizes could trigger an 
advance in GHG-reducing technologies that research-subsidizing levers might not have 
produced. A prize established in more avant-garde areas could be used to encourage 
conventional research groups to pursue less conventional research directions. Although it might 
be inefficient for the government to assume the risk of up-front funding of such research given 
relatively low probabilities of success, a prize could provoke focused private R&D investment 
among the researchers most knowledgeable in those areas.  
4.4.  Determining the Financial Award 
After the specific research area is selected, the organizers must determine the magnitude 
of the financial award. In practice, it might make sense in many cases to determine the available 
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technological goals. If funding is constrained—either by the federal budgetary process or by the 
resources of the private individuals involved—then some research areas might be simply 
unrealistic due to their high cost levels. For example, picking a research target of a major 
advance in nuclear generation is unlikely to have an effect, if one only has the resources to offer 
a modest award. The costs involved in the research would dwarf the prize’s incentive 
capabilities.  
When funding does not dictate the research target, the technological focus plays a 
substantial role in deciding the magnitude of the financial reward. Informing the issue is the 
model, discussed in Section 2.1, that indicates that higher development costs, a greater social 
gain from the innovation, and lower probabilities of success all require higher prizes. Sponsors 
should bear this in mind—as well as the possible inefficiency of overly large prizes—when 
making their decisions. Thus, for a given social benefit, a goal expected to incur moderate 
research costs, such as an incremental improvement in energy efficiency in a given appliance, 
should be paired with a moderate financial award. A grander technological goal, incurring higher 
costs and a lower likelihood of success—such as the development of a commercially viable 
hydrogen storage system for cars—should be matched with a larger financial reward. The more 
quantitative information that can be brought to bear on the costs, benefits, and research 
effectiveness variables discussed earlier, the more carefully the award amount could be 
determined. 
This type of information needs to be better developed. Uncertainty over the damages 
from climate change and the stringency and likelihood of future policy actions impede estimation 
of the social and private gain to any invention that mitigates GHG emissions. The low stringency 
of policies that account for the environmental costs of emissions means that there is insufficient 
incentive for firms to adopt GHG-reducing technologies. This would suggest, on the one hand, 
that the private benefit to climate-oriented innovation could be small, meaning that the financial 
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international action is growing, which could make the patents to low emission technologies 
financially lucrative and reduce the difference between social and private benefits to innovation. 
Any climate prize designer must balance these uncertainties with others. For example, how 
would the media receive a climate-oriented prize? Would such a prize attract more or less 
attention than a space travel–oriented prize from the media? Could relevant firms engaged in 
energy, environmental, and transportation technology research translate that attention into some 
form of reputational or monetary gain? One could imagine that it would in the case of 
automobile manufacturers, but perhaps would not in the case of manufacturers of building 
products. The answers to these questions would affect the size of the prize being offered, as well 
as whether or not it is designed to purchase the property rights to the technology.  
Che and Gale (2003) suggest another method for determining the size of the prize that 
seeks to circumvent the sponsor’s need for information. The authors argue that the optimal 
solution can be reached by allowing researchers to, in effect, compete in two ways. First, they 
would compete technically by means of their research proposals. Second, they could vie (i.e., 
bid) in terms of the size of the prize they would accept for their efforts. As a general notion, 
economists argue that in a situation such as this with asymmetric information, it is more efficient 
for the party with better information to choose the price (Tirole 1993). Che and Gale (2003) 
show that adding the second competitive element increases efficiency by allowing 
technologically disadvantaged researchers to remain viable by lowering the payoff they would 
accept. Although this method offers some efficiency gains in theory, it would likely raise other 
issues, because the sponsor would have to decide how to judge different entrants’ bids.  
The issue of financial magnitude is further complicated if one incorporates flexibility into 
what exactly is being incentivized. Our earlier conception discussion implicitly laid prizes on top 
of the patent system: The prize designer simply adds an extra incentive for a company to develop 
a technology for its own future use or sale. Thus, the prizewinner would own the intellectual 
property to the technology that won. This need not be the only way a prize could be used. Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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Several commentators have suggested that prizes should be used to incentivize research that 
would subsequently be placed in the public sphere (Wright 1983; Davis 2002; Holtz-Eakin 2004; 
Tirole 1993). The financial award in this case would in effect be purchasing the patent rights to 
the new development.  
Such a “patent buyout” approach is actually a refinement of an anti-patent intellectual 
movement that dates back to the 19th century and beyond (Davis 2002; Kremer 1998; Polanvyi 
1944; Shavell and Ypersele 1999). The proponents of this patent buyout approach argue that the 
property rights system should be replaced by a scheme where the government pays a lump sum 
to an inventor based on the societal benefit derived from the innovation. The knowledge would 
then be publicly available to anyone interested in using it, avoiding the deadweight losses 
attributable to inventors’ temporary patent monopolies. Various scholars have shown that when 
the values of inventions are knowable, prize-based systems dominate traditional property-rights 
systems (Wright 1983; Maurer and Scotchmer 2003). Despite their theoretical superiority, such 
systems have never been widely implemented because of the great difficulty that authorities face 
in determining the value of an innovation before it has been adopted. 
Though still a major drawback, the need for information would be less of a problem if 
used on a limited basis, such as in the case of targeted technology prizes. If a sponsor felt 
suitably convinced that the social good required immediate broad access to a given technology, it 
could set up a patent-buyout prize competition. In exchange for a significantly higher monetary 
award (to compensate for the loss of private benefits), the winning entrant would give up the 
intellectual property rights to the innovations (Holtz-Eakin 2004). For example, if DARPA 
sought to create several competitive suppliers of driverless vehicles, it would have set up the 
Grand Challenge so that the prize-winning technology would become available to other firms. 
Instead, the rules to the Challenge clearly specified that this is not the case: “DARPA claims no 
intellectual property (IP) rights from entrants, semifinalists, finalists, or the winner. . . . All trade Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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secrets, copyrights, patent rights, and software rights will remain with each respective team" 
(DARPA 2004).  
Another key issue that a prize designer must confront is how the award is structured. One 
option is to simply give the winner one or more cash payments, which has traditionally been the 
most common method. But the prize could come in other forms. One of the most obvious 
alternatives would be the use of a pre-specified supply contract (Kremer 2000). The prize 
designer would promise to award a contract to purchase a given number of units that incorporate 
the newly developed technology at a given price. Using this type of prize formula could have 
implications that differ from those of a more straightforward reward payment. By linking the 
award to production, the prize designer incentivizes the development of not just a new 
technology, but also of one that can be reproduced commercially. There are downsides to such a 
program, however. It is difficult to anticipate many entrants that specialize in research but not 
mass production, or for them to develop a commercially replicable process on their own. The 
costs would simply be too high, particularly for GHG reduction.  
The example of the SERP prize mentioned in Section 3.1 helps expose some of the issues 
that can arise from a more complex reward structure. In that case, Whirlpool won the right to 
collect demand-side rebate money that could add up to $30.7 million if it sold 250,000 units. 
Scholars offer several reasons for the failure of Whirlpool to collect the full amount. First, the 
prize sponsor may have misjudged the market, incentivizing the development of a high-end, 
high-cost product for which there was little demand. But at least as important as the failure to 
pick a suitable means objective was the remuneration structure. In order to receive the rebate per 
unit sold, the Whirlpool dealers had to submit considerable amounts of paperwork. Although this 
may have led to inadequate attention from sales staff in and of itself, take-up of the new unit was 
further inhibited by the fact that instructions were poorly explained to the sales staff, who did not 
realize that some of the SERP units’ high costs would be defrayed by the prize money 
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4.5.  Setting the Victory Conditions 
The last major decision the prize designer must make is how the winner will be chosen—
the victory conditions. To a considerable extent, the methods can be split into two categories: 
“first past the post” and “contests.”14 As with all the design factors, the choice can have non-
trivial implications. These have opposing advantages and disadvantages, and the choice between 
them should reflect the priorities of the prize sponsor.  
The first-past-the-post method is simple. The prize is essentially a race to achieve a given 
technological breakthrough with the prize designer committing to award the prize to the first 
competitor to achieve the stipulated goal. No other factors are taken into account. This approach 
to determine the winner is stereotypical, and was used by both the British government in its 
pursuit of accurately calculated longitude in 1714 and by the X-Prize in 2004. The virtue of this 
classical approach is the same as its greatest problem: simplicity. The benefits lie in the fact that 
there is relatively little room for subjectivity. Either the entrant is the first to meet a certain 
technological threshold, or it is not. Although this may not guarantee that the prize will be 
awarded promptly—John Harrison had to wait over a decade for royal intervention in order to 
receive his longitude prize—it does curtail the extent to which political or other elements could 
influence the prize decision. It also specifies what the prize sponsor desires: a given 
technological advance. If a more modest research effort is unacceptable, this method has much to 
recommend it.  
As suggested above, such simplicity also has a downside. The chief problem is that the 
first-past-the-post method prioritizes speed rather than quality. It is not difficult to imagine a 
situation where another competitor develops a better (perhaps more efficient) method, but 
finishes second to a faster (perhaps more expensive) entrant. In the extreme, this could lead to a 
type of “lock in” whereby an inferior technology is accepted in lieu of a better one for reasons of 
historical contingency (David 1986).  
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Using a contest-like approach to determine the winner can avoid this outcome. A contest 
prize typically differs from a first-past-the-post prize by not specifying a particular level of 
technological achievement that must be achieved. Instead, contestants have a specific amount of 
time to develop a technology that will be judged on a given set of criteria. Researchers pursue the 
level and types of research that best balances their costs and expectations of victory. At the 
specified time, their entries are evaluated on the basis of the prize sponsor’s goals. 
In some cases, a panel of experts chooses the winner in a contest-type prize. Similar to a 
beauty contest, the judges weigh a combination of criteria in choosing the best entrant. This 
review process could include the size of the payoff that the competitor would accept, if Che and 
Gale’s (2003) framework were adopted.15 For example, the judges might decide that, whereas 
one entry achieved more of a technological leap forward, it did so at such a high price that 
another entry is more deserving. Although such a process allows the prize sponsor great 
flexibility in choosing its ideal competitor, it is vulnerable to criticism for its subjectivity. 
Knowing that the winner will not be chosen objectively could create skepticism among potential 
contestants and reduce participation.  
Some of this subjectivity can be removed by selecting the winner of the research contest 
through some form of physical test (Maurer and Scotchmer 2003). This approach has some of the 
characteristics of a first-past-the-post prize, but it differs in not specifying a certain threshold. 
For example, the DARPA Grand Challenge uses a physical contest to decide the winner. Unlike 
a first-past-the-post method, the prize administrators decided not to declare the first contestant to 
develop a driverless vehicle capable of crossing the Mojave the winner. Instead, DARPA uses a 
physical race to obtain better insight into the optimal balance between durability and speed in an 
autonomous vehicle. Using a first-past-the-post approach might achieve a given target as soon as 
possible, but it might not produce the “best” technology. 
                                                 
15 In such cases, there would need to be a subsequent step (e.g., procurement) to ensure that the government did not 
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It is helpful to compare and contrast climate-oriented examples of first-past-the-post and 
contest prizes. For the purpose of the example, both center on furthering research into 
photovoltaic technologies. The first prize uses a first-past-the-post format that specifies that a 
certain cost per megawatt hour rate be achieved. The second prize is contest based, which simply 
states that the prize sponsor sought the biggest improvement in cost per megawatt hour that was 
achievable in a year. Depending on the specific target set for the first prize, the sponsors might 
have the same winner, but they just as easily might not. It is easy to imagine that the first-past-
the-post method might not result in a winner within the deadline set for the second prize. 
Similarly, it seems unlikely that technological change achieved by the contest winner would 
equal that specified in the first prize (Maurer and Scotchmer 2003). The decision regarding 
which option is preferable should have a major impact on whether the prize sponsor sets up a 
contest or a first-past-the-post prize.  
Both types of prize structures can be planned to at least reduce the potential for socially 
wasteful or duplicative research spending. Marginal entrants can be screened from both first-
past-the-post and contest prizes by requiring an entry fee (Moldovanu and Sela 2001). Instead of 
having the sponsor arbitrarily set a fee based on a presumption of players’ costs, other authors 
have suggested that a given number of entrants could be selected on the basis of an auction 
(Fullerton and McAfee 1999). Other screening mechanisms are prize-type specific. For example, 
contest-prizes can reduce the number of final entrants by making use of an intermediate 
competition, whereby those entrants who failed to achieve a given result or rank would be 
disallowed from competing for the final prize.  
All of these contestant elimination mechanisms prevent marginal participants from 
pouring resources into a competition they are unlikely to win. The disadvantage of culling is that 
it might eliminate competitors that could subsequently develop competition-winning 
technologies. It might also screen out small firms without the initial capital to compete with 
larger firms. As we discussed in Section 2.3, however, such small firms have historically been Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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closely associated with more revolutionary technological developments. Eliminating them may 
remove one of the key benefits of prizes. The prize sponsor must therefore attempt to balance the 
tension between too many candidates and too few candidates, both of which could lead to 
inefficient research levels. 
The institutional setting of the prize could also play a significant role in influencing the 
victory conditions. A purely private prize could use either first-past-the-post or contest prizes 
with equal facility, but a governmental prize could have difficulty using a first-past-the-post 
approach if it was likely that the prize might not be won within the year. As noted in Section 4.1, 
getting dispensation to save money not spent in the year for which it was allocated could increase 
the bureaucratic hurdles to establishing the prize.  
5. Conclusion 
There is considerable evidence that technology prizes have a role to play in the portfolio 
of inducement mechanisms available to spur climate change–related technological advances. An 
examination of the economics of prizes revealed that they have conceptual advantages that 
support increasing their role in certain cases. There are almost 300 years of evidence on their 
successful implementation. These factors underlie the already growing resurgence of interest in 
using inducement prizes to increase research into public goods. In addition to these broad 
reasons for considering prizes, there also appear to be compelling reasons specifically related to 
climate change. For example, climate-mitigation technologies are already an implicit part of the 
renaissance: both of the NASA Centennial Challenges could have climate-friendly applications. 
Furthermore, the scope of technologies that could reduce GHG emissions is so broad that it is 
hard to imagine that there is not room for prizes to play a constructive role. Given their 
infrequent recent use but potential promise, policy experimentation and subsequent evaluation of 
prizes for GHG-reduction technologies would be clearly desirable. Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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As both theory and the historic evidence suggests, however, getting the design of prizes 
correct is critical. Therefore, interested parties from both the public and private sectors should 
carefully consider how their specific resources and goals relate to the different prize design 
elements. For the government, the process of establishing prizes devoted to developing GHG-
reducing technologies could begin with congressional action that directs a more thorough 
investigation of the potential role and design of a federal climate technology prizes, perhaps by 
the National Research Council or other suitable institution. Alternatively, perhaps an interested 
foundation, corporation, or individual will be inspired to offer a climate technology prize. 
Regardless of the institutional setting of the prize, it is essential that any policy experimentation 
be followed by thorough evaluation to understand the actual effectiveness and efficiency of these 
potentially important instruments of technology policy, and how their design influences the 
results they achieve. Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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Table 1. Comparison of Alternative Technology Policy Instruments 
  Prizes  Contracts and grants 
Pros 
• Prizes solve information problems by 
devolving risk onto researchers. 
• Prizes reward outputs. 
• They require less of a governmental 
investment than do direct contracts. 
• Prizes leverage considerable non-financial 
incentives. 
• They encourage small, innovative players 
to participate by lowering barriers to entry. 
 
• Contracts and grants avoid duplicative 
research. 
• In case of basic research, mutually aligned 
incentives reduce informational 
asymmetries. 
• Modifications (e.g., use of a preproposal 
process) can reduce principal-agent 
problems. 
• Contracts and grants are able to encourage 
high-cost research. 
Cons 
• Prizes can lead to excessive duplication of 
effort. 
• They are less suited to high-cost projects 
where researchers cannot bear all risks. 
• Up-front liquidity constraints of prizes 
could lower participation. 
• Participants are susceptible to shirking 
because of information asymmetry 
problems. 
• There are high non-financial barriers to 
entry. 
• Contracts and grants are less appropriate 
for applied technology research. 
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Table 2. History of Technology Inducement Prizes 
Date 
Won  Prize Description 
1762 Longitude 
 
The British government sponsored a financial prize to induce research into the 
development of an improved method of ascertaining longitude while at sea. It used a 




The French government under Napoleon offered a financial prize to the first person 




A Chicago newspaperman sponsored a race and a series of related contests, all of 
which used derivatives of the contest approach to determining winners. The race and 




Through a series of races, private sponsors incentivized incremental improvements 
in plane design. Other private sponsors established first-past-the-post distance 
prizes. 
 
1997 Refrigerators   
 
Established by a consortium of utility companies in association with the EPA, the 
Super-Efficient Refrigerator Program (SERP) encouraged the development and sale 
of a more energy-efficient refrigerator. 
 
2004  Private space 
flight 
 
The heavily publicized $10 million privately established Ansari X-Prize encouraged 
research into private space flight. 
 
2004–5  Driverless 
vehicles 
 
First attempted in 2004, DARPA’s Grand Challenge uses a race format to encourage 








NASA has established the Centennial Challenges program to induce pathbreaking 
research in several areas. Although NASA sponsors the prizes, the bulk of the 
administration is handled by the nonprofit Spaceward Foundation. At present, prizes 
have been established for 2005 and 2006, but the program is expected to extend 
beyond that date. 
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Table 3. Design Elements of Technology Prizes 




Whether a prize is established by the public or private sector could have a substantial effect. 
A government prize will have to address political interests and related issues, as well as 





Creative thought is required to translate broad goals into concrete technical objectives 
suitable for a prize. The technological target should be carefully chosen to suit the prize 
sponsor’s overall goals and their financial and administrative capabilities, while providing a 





The prize’s financial award should fit the specific target. If a prize is too large, it could lead 
to excessive research, but if it is too small it will lead to an inefficiently small amount of 
attention from researchers. The award can be a single cash prize or a guarantee of future 





In deciding whether to choose the winner based on who is first past the post or on a contest 
basis, the prize sponsor should pay close attention to their priorities. First-past-the-post 
methods emphasize speed and an explicit focus on a specific technical target, whereas 
contests offer more flexibility for maximizing achievement over a given timeframe. 
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Appendix 
The following discussion builds on a model of innovative activity developed by Wright (1983). 
The invention I is discrete, and its discovery leads to private gains V to the discovering firm. In 
addition to these private gains, the discovery leads to an increase in social benefits B that is not 
captured by the discovering firm. In pursuit of the innovation, each firm (denoted by i) incurs 
certain costs  ( , ) i crR, which are a function of private research expenditures ri  and the total 
amount of research R by all firms. The probability that the innovation is developed is a 
function—P(R)—of the total amount of research. We assume that the marginal probability of 
success is decreasing in R. In other words, over the relevant range each additional dollar of 
research investment has a smaller impact on the probability of successfully developing the 
innovation.  
The economic problem from society’s perspective is to maximize the difference between 
the expected overall social value of the prize and the research costs:  
(1)  ( ) :() ()
R Max P R B V C R +− . 
Put another way, taking the derivative with respect to R leads to the expected result that 
the optimal value of aggregate research R
* is the point at which the expected marginal social 
benefit of research equals its marginal cost:  
(2)  ( )
** () () PR BV cR ′′ += . 
If R
V is the amount of research that the firm would have performed simply because of 
private incentives, then the patent system will lead to the optimal amount of research only if R
V 
=R
*. This would imply that the market perfectly captured all of the benefits and costs to the 
development of the new technology. Scholars have shown that because of various spillover 
effects, this rarely occurs. To remedy the market’s failure to produce the optimal amount of 
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the level of research spending to R
*. The traditional policy lever has been to subsidize inputs to 
research by buying R
*-R
V of research through the use of contracts or grants. Prizes work 
somewhat more subtly. If the prize sponsor offers a prize of Z for the development of the 
innovation, firms face a different profit maximization problem. Their expected returns would be 
a function both of the overall likelihood that the innovation will be developed and a firm’s 
unique probability of being the innovator. For the sake of simplicity, we approximate the latter 
probability as the ratio of the firm’s private research investment to all investment, ri /R. Faced 
with a prize Z, the private maximization problem is 













Z Vc r R
R
′ += . 








= − . 
It is important to note that in this discussion we follow Wright in assuming away the possibility 
of duplicative research across firms. This is a significant assumption given the relevance of 
duplicative spending to the overall efficiency of a given technology policy. 
Therefore, the optimal research expenditures will be determined by the average 
probability of success ( () PR R ), rather than the marginal probability of successful innovation 
( () PR ′ ), as was the case above. This has significant implications for the proper design of a 
technology prize. Because the marginal probability of innovative success is decreasing in the 
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In other words, the average probability of success will tend to be greater than the 
marginal probability of success. Therefore, if the prize is set equal to the full external social 
value of the innovation (B), then a prize will lead to excessive research. This means that the prize 
sponsor should make Z a fraction f of the total social value, minus the privately captured value 









Thus, f is the elasticity of the probability of successful innovation with respect to research effort, 
or the percent change in P for a 1 percent increase in R. Resources for the Future                                                                                                 Newell and Wilson 
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